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Explicit Evidence of an Implicit Contract 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We offer the first direct evidence of an implicit contract in a goods market. The evidence 
comes from the market for Coca-Cola. We demonstrate that the Coca-Cola Company left 
a written evidence of its implicit contract with its consumers—a very explicit form of an 
implicit contract. The contract promised a 5¢ price and adherence to the “Secret 
Formula.” Because implicit contracts are unobservable, we adopt a narrative approach. 
Analyzing a large number of historical documents, we offer evidence of the Company 
both acknowledging and acting on this implicit contract. We explore quality as a margin 
of adjustment available to Coca-Cola. The implicit contract included a promise not only 
of a constant price but also a constant quality (the “real thing”). During a period of over 
70 years, we find evidence of only a single case of true quality change. We demonstrate 
that the perceived costs of breaking the implicit contract were large.  
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1. Introduction 
Okun (1981) popularized "invisible handshakes," or implicit contracts, as a possible 
source of price rigidity. They have most often been explored in the context of wage 
setting in labor markets (Rosen, 1985, 1994). However, implicit contracts may plausibly 
exist in consumer goods markets as well.1 To our knowledge, however, no studies offer 
direct evidence of this.2 We offer the first direct and, in fact, quite explicit evidence of 
such an implicit contract. The evidence comes from the market for Coca-Cola.  
Starting in 1886, in the bottle or at the fountain, 6.5oz of Coca-Cola retailed for 5¢. 
With remarkably few deviations, this nominal price did not adjust for over 60 years. The 
nickel Coke did not entirely disappear from US markets until 1959—over 70 years! 
During this time there was also remarkable quality rigidity with less than one change per 
decade on average to the “Secret Formula” (Levy and Young, 2004). We argue that an 
implicit contract with consumers was associated with both the price and quality rigidity.   
The lack of studies offering direct evidence of implicit contracts is not surprising as 
they are "tacit agreements that are not written down [and] the theory does not predict 
literal price rigidity, but only that prices are relatively insensitive to fluctuations in 
demand” (Blinder, et al., 1988, p. 152). As “hard” data are hard to come by, we adopt a 
narrative approach (Romer and Romer, 1989, 1994; Zbaracki, et al., 2004).3  
The Coca-Cola price rigidity is exceptional relative to the evidence reported on US 
prices.4 Cecchetti (1986) reports that magazine prices change only every 3–6 years on 
                                                 
1
 Okun (1981) introduced the term “customer markets” to refer to those goods markets where long-term 
relationships can exist between sellers and buyers. 
2
 Renner and Tyran (2004) present experimental evidence that long-term relationships based on trust can 
form to mitigate “lemons” problems when cost shocks are difficult for consumers to discern. 
3
 As Romer and Romer (1989) emphasize, a narrative approach allows one to exploit a large body of soft 
data containing qualitative information that is difficult to employ in conventional econometric studies. 
4
 Earlier survey studies summarizing this literature include Rotemberg (1987), Gordon (1991), Weiss 
(1993), and Romer (1993). For more recent surveys, see Willis (2003), Levy (2007), Wolman (2007), 
Klenow and Malin (2010), and Leahy (2011). Several studies conducted by the European Central Bank and 
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average. Using business-to-business industrial price data, Carlton (1986) finds that prices 
remain unchanged for several years. Kashyap (1995) studies catalog prices of 12 retail 
goods for 35 years and reports an average duration of 15 months. Blinder, et al. (1988), 
based on survey evidence from firms, conclude that, on average, prices lag supply or 
demand changes by 3 months.5 Recent studies using micro-level transaction price data 
report similar figures (e.g., Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008; Nakamura and Zerom, 
2010).6 In comparison, the Coca-Cola price rigidity lasted at least an order of magnitude 
longer.  
The Coca-Cola Company is one of the most successful and recognized producers of a 
consumer good in the world. During the time period we study, the soft drink industry and 
the Coca-Cola Company itself were non-negligible parts of the US economy. For 
example, in 1945 the bottled non-alcoholic carbonated beverage industry was 0.26% of 
US GDP (Riley, 1942, p. 343). The Company had a roughly 50% market share in that 
industry, making its own contribution an economically significant 0.13% of GDP. 
In Levy and Young (2004) we argue that an explicit contract between Coca-Cola and 
its bottlers was a source of price rigidity. The contract fixed the price of Coca-Cola syrup 
to bottlers. Given this, the Company could increase profits only by selling more syrup. 
Thus the Company pursued a policy of retail price maintenance.7 The contract, however, 
                                                                                                                                                 
its member EU central banks report that EU prices tend to be more rigid than US prices. Álvarez, et al, 
(2006), Dhyne, et al. (2006), and Levy and Smets (2010) summarize these studies. 
5
 Levy et al. (2002), Genesove (2003) and Young and Blue (2007) document price rigidities for, 
respectively, orange juice products (about a month), apartment rental rates (a few months), and goods sold 
through Sears catalogs (over two years in some cases). Some studies, however, report more frequent price 
changes (e.g., Levy, et al., 1997; Dutta, et al., 1999; Dutta, et al., 2002; Bills and Klenow, 2004). 
6
 See also Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007, 2013), Anderson and Simester (2010), Gopinath and Itskhoki 
(2010, 2011), Chevalier and Kashyap (2011), and Anderson, et al. (2012).   
7
 Two technology-based factors help to explain the continuation of the nickel price beyond 1921. First, the 
vending machines with nickel-only capability and limited change-making technology imposed a constraint 
on price adjustment. Second, the smallest price increase compatible with consumers using a single coin was 
100%. A monetary transaction technology for smaller price adjustments, keeping consumer "inconvenience 
costs" low, was not available. Daly (1970) documents widespread consumer inconvenience costs due to a 
small change shortage in Brazil. Selgin (2008) documents how in late 1700s UK private coinage flourished 
in response to a shortage of smaller denomination coins. In Knotek (2008), firms incorporate convenience 
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lasted until 1921 and cannot explain the additional 38 years of price rigidity. 
Here we address the presence of an implicit contract between Coca-Cola and its 
consumers. We argue that it was an important source of the price rigidity during 
19211959. However, we stress that the explicit contract with bottlers and the implicit 
contract with consumers are related: the former contributed to and reinforced the latter.    
We argue that the implicit contract included the promise of a constant price and 
constant quality. We document the dedication to the 6.5oz serving of the Secret Formula. 
Over a 73-year period, only seven changes in the Secret Formula occurred. Of those, we 
argue that only one could have been substituted for by a price adjustment. 
In section 2 we document the Coca-Cola price and quality rigidities and discuss 
changes in economic conditions and marginal costs. In section 3 we describe implicit 
contracts and the problems that they can solve, and show that the Company perceived 
such problems as important. In section 4 we present our evidence of an implicit contract. 
In section 5 we address the link between the implicit and explicit contracts. We consider 
some alternative explanations for the nickel Coke in section 6 and conclude in section 7. 
  
2. The Coca-Cola Episode: Price and Quality Rigidity 
The nickel Coke began in 1886 with an Atlanta peddler of patent medicines. John Stith 
Pemberton had the ingenious idea to sell Coca-Cola in 5¢ fountain servings rather than in 
75¢ or $1 medicine bottles. The world’s most famous soft drink was born. If he were 
alive, Pemberton might well be shocked to learn that the nickel Coke remained largely 
uniform for over 60 years and did not disappear for over 70 years. 
Whether in a bottle or at a soda fountain, 6.5oz Coca-Cola retailed for 5¢. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
into pricing decisions. The model can account for the dynamics of US newspaper prices. Knotek (2011) 
extends the evidence to convenience store products. Eckard (2007) argues that relatively few “even” price 
points reduced cashier transaction costs.   
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remarkably few exceptions were unpopular with consumers. As late as 1951, Fortune 
magazine reported that Louisiana dealers, seeking to pass on cost increases to consumers, 
had to backtrack as consumers threatened to “take all their business elsewhere […]” 
“Everybody knows Coke sells for a nickel – look at the back of this week’s Life” (p. 129).  
During the more than 70 years of price rigidity, Coca-Cola also exhibited remarkable 
quality rigidity. Schaeffer and Bateman (1985) document merely six changes in the 
Secret Formula from 1886 to 1960. We found evidence of one additional, temporary 
change. Two of the changes were exogenously imposed. All but one of the other changes 
were attempts to keep quality unchanged. Since we argue that constant quality was a part 
of the implicit contract, we elaborate briefly on each Formula change. 
The first documented change was an addition of glycerin in 1889 to prevent the syrup 
from turning rancid in storage. The syrup was also altered by “adding essential 
ingredients and by taking others out of the Pemberton Formula” in order to make the 
ingredients more “compatible” with each other (Schaeffer and Bateman, 1985, p. 4). By 
all accounts, these changes were made to prevent perishing and ensure constant quality at 
different fountain locations. 
In 1899 the second documented change occurred. The Company decided to prepare 
two syrups—one for fountains and one for bottles. The syrup for bottles contained more 
sugar, less water, more caramel, more citric acid, less caffeine, and more phosphoric acid 
(Allen, 1994, p. 9). The goal was to ensure that the drink, at the fountain or from a bottle, 
had the same taste; that is, to ensure uniform quality. 
The third change was the indirect result of an 1898 tax on medicines. Coca-Cola was 
still marketed as a medicine and a tax of $29,502 was charged, which the Company 
contested. At trial in 1901, Company president Asa Candler admitted under oath to Coca-
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Cola having “a very small trace” of cocaine.8 The Company outsourced the preparation of 
“Merchandise No. 5” (containing coca leaf and kola nut extracts) to remove the cocaine 
completely. This change was made under exogenous threat of prosecution.   
The fourth change came in 1904. The Company was using powdered sugar which 
carried moisture and tended to sour during transportation (Candler, 1950). A switch to 
granulated sugar was made.9 Since we find no evidence of consumers perceiving a 
change in quality, the two sugar types were likely perfect (or very close) substitutes.  
A lawsuit brought by the USDA under the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 led to the 
fifth change. The 1909 lawsuit claimed Coca-Cola was “misbranded” because its name 
promised kola and coca but contained little of either; and it was “adulterated” by added 
caffeine.10 In April 1918, the Company agreed to a settlement which included reducing 
the caffeine by almost two-thirds. This change was exogenously imposed. 
The sixth change occurred when, in response to WWI sugar shortages and rationing, 
Company president Howard Candler (Asa’s son) stockpiled sugar at 28¢/lb (almost four 
times its pre-war price). When the price of sugar then plummeted (Atlanta Georgian, 
February 15, 1921) the Company found itself committed to over $8 million on sugar at 
twice the going price (Landers, 1950). To avoid future replays, the Company developed 
syrup based on beet sugar.11 With the help of a German scientist, the Company developed 
a beet sugar that did not change Coca-Cola’s flavor.  
We found evidence of one additional (temporary) Secret Formula change. In 1942, 
WWII sugar shortages led Company president Robert Woodruff to reluctantly approve 
                                                 
8
 As a result, Coca-Cola was banned at the military canteen and post exchanges by the US War Department 
in 1907. Source: Henry A. Rucker (Collector of Internal Revenue) v. The Coca-Cola Company, U. Circuit 
Court, District of Georgia (Trial and Appeal Record, Federal Records Center, East Point, Georgia). The 
company later sued the government and the tax payments were returned (Allen, 1994, p. 43).   
9
 Candler agreed to switch to granulated sugar after learning that he was paying freight on the moisture. 
10
 Source: United State v. Forty Barrels and Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola, 241 U.S. 265, 289, record of 
appeal from the Federal Records Center, East Point, Georgia. 
11
 Beets can be grown in more regions than cane sugar and, thus, by switching to it the Company hoped to 
maintain a more continuous supply of Coca-Cola. 
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the use of a small amount of saccharine in place of sugar. In a letter to his accountant, 
Woodruff acknowledged his hesitation: “Of course you know I am very leery about these 
things and much prefer not to do anything of the kind, except as a matter of life and 
death”12 (italics added). At that time there were also shortages of caffeine and coca 
leaves. Woodruff approved a temporary cutback in the amount of those ingredients as 
well. There is no evidence, however, that customers perceived a change in flavor.  Even if 
all seven episodes are interpreted as quality changes, they exhaust the more than 70 years 
that we study – less than one change per decade.  
Price and quality rigidities are noteworthy only relative to changing market 
conditions. The years 1886–1959 featured numerous shocks affecting the soft drink 
market. During the Spanish-American War a tax was imposed on patent medicines and 
Coca-Cola deemed liable for 1/8¢ on every nickel drink (Riley, 1942, p. 26). There were 
also the demand-side shocks of Prohibition in 1920 and its repeal in 1933. The repeal 
occurred during the Great Depression, another large demand shock. The Company also 
faced prolonged investigation under the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.13 
To stress the importance of the changing economic conditions for the Coca-Cola 
Company, we focus on (i) changes in marginal materials costs and (ii) shortages of 
materials induced by regulatory interventions (government rationing). The most 
important material input was sugar. (By volume Coca-Cola is over 10% sugar.) Materials 
generally were important components of costs. 
From 1879 to 1955, materials costs were between 30% and 50% of soft drink industry 
production value (Table 1). In 1920 the price of sugar was about $0.10/lb (Allen, 1994, p. 
104). The Company was using about 100 million pounds of sugar annually (The Coca-
                                                 
12
 Source: Robert W. Woodruff in a letter to Arthur Acklin, October 2, 1942, Robert W. Woodruff Papers, 
Special Collections Section, Emory University Library. 
13
 For a comprehensive list of changes in market conditions see Levy and Young (2004, pp. 771–773). 
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Cola Company, 1925), and 1920 sales were about $32 million (Annual Report, 1921). 
This puts sugar costs alone in 1920 at 31% of sales. Compare this to Coca-Cola’s 
advertising expenditures share of sales (Table 1; column 3), which ranged between 8% 
and 17%. 
  
<<COMP: Place Table 1 about here>> 
  
The importance of materials costs generally, and sugar costs specifically, lends 
perspective to several shocks weathered by the Coca-Cola Company. For example, in 
1917 WWI sugar rationing was imposed. In May of that year, sugar sold for $0.08/lb., up 
from an average of $0.05 that had held over many years (Pendergrast, 1993, p. 129). This 
was a 60% increase for an input constituting at least one third of costs. (Around the same 
time, the Company experienced shortages of caffeine and caramel as well.) Then late in 
1919 the price of sugar reached $0.16 and sugar purchases were about 67% of Coca-Cola 
revenues (Allen, 1994, p. 104).14 There would have been relief from high sugar costs 
following WWI except for Howard Candler’s ill-advised stockpiling of sugar. By 1921, 
Coca-Cola had warehouses full of contracted sugar while the market price was 3¢/lb 
(Fortune, 1951).  
Sugar rationing was reenacted during WWII. At the worst point, producers were 
rationed 50% of their prewar levels (Pendergrast, 1993, p. 201).15  There were also 
"shortages of crowns, bottles, cases, gasoline, trucks, equipment, [and] manpower" 
(Riley, 1942, p. 86). At the onset of WWII, the price of sugar was $0.02/lb. By the end of 
                                                 
14
 Interestingly, there is no evidence of Coca-Cola retail prices adjusting upward during WWI when its 
production costs soared, although during the postwar inflation there were isolated reports of retailers 
charging 6¢ or 7¢ for a Coke. Note that the Coca-Cola Company had no direct/legal control over the price 
that retailers charged. Levy and Young (2004, pp. 774–777) describe in detail some of the methods and 
techniques the Company used to “convince” the retailers that the nickel price was in their advantage. 
15
 Allen (1994, p. 251) states that the number was 80 percent of prewar levels. 
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WWII, the price was $0.08, up by 300% (Allen, 1994, p. 276).16   
Ultimately, it would be postwar inflation rather than any specific input cost that led to 
the demise of the nickel Coke. By the late 1940s, with production costs soaring, a handful 
of bottlers began charging the retailers 90¢–$1.00/case, up from 80¢.17 In response some 
retailers raised the price.  Time (1950b, p. 12) observed that, "In New York City, bottled 
Coca-Cola broke loose from its nickel moorings and for the first time went to 6¢." Still, 
in 1950 only 125 of the 1,100 bottlers had initiated price increases to retailers.  In 1951, 
when about 33% of bottlers had increased their traditional $0.80/case wholesale price, 
Coca-Cola dropped the placing of "5¢" in its advertising material.18 In 1955, Business 
Week (1955, p. 44) reported that a "bottle of Coke today sells for 6¢, 7¢ or even 10¢ 
depending on the area."19 By 1959 the last of the nickel cokes was gone. 
 
3. Implicit Contracts 
Implicit contracts are "arrangements that are not legally binding but that give both sides 
incentives to maintain the relationship" (Okun, 1981, pp. 49–50).20 We argue that an 
implicit contract guaranteed a constant nominal price and quality of Coca-Cola and that 
the consumers valued this guarantee. 
 
3.1 Economic Rationales for Implicit Contracts 
Sellers and buyers may enter into implicit contracts for various reasons. First, consumers 
                                                 
16
 WWII shortages led to temporary use of sugar substitute and decreases in caffeine and coca contents. 
17
 Source: The Coca-Cola Company, Fact Sheet. 
18
 Source: “Memorandum to: Mr. Nicholson” (Coca-Cola Company, January, 1951) and “The Price 
Situation” (Coca-Cola Company, February, 1951). 
19
 As well, Coca-Cola began introducing various bottle sizes at various prices. 
20
 Such informal agreements are termed “implicit,” “self-enforcing,” or “relational” (Gil and Marion, 2012). 
For example, Telser (1980, p. 27) refers to a “self-enforcing agreement” as one that “remains in force as 
long as each party believes himself to be better off by continuing the agreement than he would be by ending 
it.” Baker, et al. (2002, p. 39) refer to “relational contracts: informal agreements and unwritten codes of 
conduct that powerfully affect the behaviors of individuals within firms.”  
11 
 
 
 
may value the guarantee of a fair price.21 There is evidence that fair prices are important 
to buyers. Kahneman, et al. (1986) provide survey evidence that the perceived fairness of 
prices is important for understanding consumer demand. In lab experiments, buyers often 
boycott, against their self-interest, sellers engaged in unfair price increases.22  
Implicit contracts may mitigate time consistency problems in case of habit-forming 
goods. Sellers may attract consumers today by promising (a continuation of) low prices in 
the future, which can lead to dynamic inconsistency because when the future comes, 
firms have an incentive to raise prices (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2011). Consumers 
anticipate that by then they will be “hooked” and that refraining from paying the high 
prices will be difficult. While explicitly contracting on future prices with individual 
consumers may be prohibitively costly, entering into an implicit contract with all 
consumers facilitates transactions in the presence of this moral hazard.  
Firms may also form implicit contracts to increase brand loyalty. Given ostensibly 
close substitutes, a firm’s brand may convey information about hard-to-observe, but 
distinctive, characteristics of the good (or the “experience” of buying it from the 
particular firm) that differentiate it from similar goods (Telser, 1980; Klein and Leffler, 
1981; Shapiro, 1983). Such hard-to-observe features create moral hazard problems. A 
brand’s reputation can signal that the firm is indeed providing those characteristics. The 
brand then “corresponds to an implicit contract between seller and buyers whereby the 
former supplies high-quality experience goods” Cabral (2000, p. 659).    
A firm’s brand may also insure consumers against pass-through of input cost 
fluctuations. Consumers may be hesitant to commit to one good exclusively if there are 
                                                 
21
 Rotemberg (2011) develops the idea of a fair price in a model where consumers interpret price changes 
according to their fairness and react accordingly. In Ball and Romer's (2003) model, prices serve as a signal 
in a long-term relationship setting between consumers and producers, leading to infrequent price 
adjustments. Bils (1989) models a customer market where customers develop an attachment to a product.   
22
 See Fehr and Gächter (2000), Levy, et al. (2002), Tyran and Engelmann (2005), and Gächter and 
Herrmann (2009). 
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close substitutes. If input costs’ fluctuations are passed on in the form of price 
fluctuations, consumers might diversify across goods.23 However, consumers may be 
willing to commit exclusively if a firm stakes its brand (its goodwill). An implicit 
contract is a credible commitment mechanism through which a firm can deliberately 
make itself vulnerable to consumer backlash if pass-through occurs.24 
The discussion above assumes that consumers are fully informed about the price, or 
that price monitoring can be done at low cost, which seems reasonable given that Coca-
Cola is a frequently bought small-ticket item. The inclusion of "5¢" in ads and 
promotional merchandise kept consumers aware of this "selling" price, making it difficult 
for retailers to charge a higher price without consumers noticing it.  
 
3.2 Coca-Cola as a Candidate Good for an Implicit Contract 
Based on the rationales discussed above we might expect the Coca-Cola Company to 
have formed an implicit contract with its consumers if Coca-Cola (1) was potentially 
habit-forming, (2) had ostensible close substitutes available while its distinctive attributes 
were difficult to observe, and (3) had relatively volatile input costs. 
That Coca-Cola was potentially habit-forming seems plausible. Coca-Cola contained 
caffeine and, up until 1918, contained an even larger amount than it does today 
(Schaeffer and Bateman, 1985).25 Furthermore, up until 1903 Coca-Cola contained small 
amounts of cocaine. The addictive potency of either ingredient (in the included amounts) 
                                                 
23
 This would be particularly true for habit-forming goods where an initially undiversified consumption 
bundle will be costly to diversify ex post. 
24
 As one anonymous reviewer noted, there is an interesting difference between implicit contracts in labor 
markets and the implicit contract documented here. In labor markets, implicit contracts are usually 
considered to protect two-sided relationship-specific investments. In the case product markets, only the 
relationship-specific investment of the consumer has to be protected. 
25
 For a recent study of habit formation in the context of soft-drinks, see Zhen, et al. (2011).  
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is debatable. Consumers, however, likely viewed Coca-Cola as habit-forming.26 This is 
suggested by the intense USDA scrutiny  following the Pure Food and Drugs Act, as well 
as by a resolution passed by the American Bottlers’ Protective Association (a trade 
association) opposing the sale of soft drinks with either ingredient.27 
As to close substitutes, there was no shortage of Coca-Cola copycats. According to 
the Company ad in the May 17, 1916 Drug Trade Journal , “[a] dozen or more 
manufacturers of imitations of Coca-Cola were either put out of business or went out of 
business with the aid of the sheriff,”28 referring to the Company’s efforts to defend its 
trademark against infringement from substitute producers. These efforts were not entirely 
successful as new copycats kept springing up.29 Indeed, both Pepsi Cola and Royal Crown 
Cola would market 12oz (rather than 6.5oz) bottles for a nickel during the Depression 
(Pendergrast, 1993, p. 193).30 While they were identical to Coca-Cola in several easily 
observable ways (e.g., brown; carbonated; liquid; sweet), Coca-Cola arguably had 
distinct, but difficult to observe, attributes (e.g., costly and exotic ingredients such as 
                                                 
26
 According to Allen’s (1994, p. 41) account, the buyers of Coca-Cola at soda fountains would often order 
the drink by asking the drugstore employee to give me “a dope” or “a shot in the arm.” This is clearly 
suggestive of the popular attitudes and perceptions towards the drink’s habit-forming properties.  
27
 The long and highly publicized legal-battles in which the Coca-Cola Company was involved following 
the government’s lawsuits, have led to a spread of the popular perceptions and accusations that the drink is 
habit forming. The spread of these views was further aided by numerous medical experts who believed that 
Coke had addictive characteristics. For example, according to Allen (1994, p. 45), Dr. J.P. Baird, who was 
the President of the Medical Association of Georgia, testified as the government witness during the 1901 
lawsuit (“Cocaine Lawsuit 1) that “Coca-Cola definitely was habit-forming… Persons who take it freely, 
seem to become more or less dependent on it.” In Chapter 2 titled “Dope,” Allen (1994) offers a detailed 
account of how these popular perceptions and beliefs spread over time across the entire US. This despite 
the (ex-post) assessment (e.g., Benjamin, et al., 1991) that most of the scholarly evidence presented by both 
sides at these court hearings seem to have been poor science, and despite the fact that most of the final 
verdicts in these court-cases were in favor of the Coca-Cola Company.  
28
 Reproduced in the Coca-Cola Company’s Advertising Copy Collection, 1916-1919, Vol. 5, 000496 ARS. 
29
 According to National Bottlers Gazette (January 5, 1917, The Coca-Cola Company Archive), the list of 
imitators grew to hundreds and included “Afri-Cola, Ameri-Cola, Ala-Cola, Bolama-Cola, Cafe-de-Ola, 
Carbo-Cola, Candy-Kola, Capa-Cola, Chero-Cola, Christo-Cola, Coke-Ola, Coo-EE-Cola, Curo-Cola, 
Grap-O-Cola, Its-A-Cola, Kaffir-Kola, Kaw-Kola, Kiss-Kola, Ko-Ca-Ama, Koca-Nola, Ko-Co-Lem-A, 
Kokola, Klu Ko Kolo, Loco Cola, Luna Cola, Mitch-O-Cola, Mo-Cola, My Cola, Roco-Cola, Toca-Cola, 
Taka-Cola, Qua-Kola, Uneeda-Cola, Zero-Cola, and Zippi-Cola.” Allen (1994, p. 73) lists these 
“counterfeit” manufacturers and offers more details about the Company’s efforts to fight them. 
30
 “Twice as much for a nickel too, Pepsi-Cola is the drink for you.” This line is from a popular 1939 Pepsi 
jingle that played on radio. 
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coca leaves and kola nuts; consistent manufacturing and bottling practices), and perhaps 
not less important, the cult of the Secret Formula.  
Finally, while it is difficult to assess Coca-Cola production cost volatility relative to 
other consumer goods, we know that sugar accounted for about a third of total costs. 
Sugar was subject to shortages, rationing, and large price fluctuations during both World 
Wars. Furthermore, just like an undiversified portfolio, the fact that one commodity 
constituted a full third of costs lends itself to higher potential cost volatility. 
 
3.3 The Coca-Cola Company’s Recognition of Consumer Concerns 
We argue above that Coca-Cola possessed characteristics associated with implicit 
contract goods. However, it was the Coca-Cola Company that formed an implicit contract 
with its consumers. The firm’s perceptions of these characteristics and of consumers’ 
concerns for these characteristics may be most important in this regard.  
Despite the existence of close substitutes, the Company believed its product was 
distinctive in important but not immediately observable ways. For example, the Company 
preached to its employees about the drink’s uniqueness in being of a “standardized” 
quality. In Reviewing a “Proud History:” 1886 to 1925 (a series of bulletins distributed 
to regional and district managers, salesmen and other employees) the Company stated 
that as early as 1887 “important progress was made in standardizing the drink [with the 
result that] today every Coca-Cola is like every other Coca-Cola.” Furthermore, the 
Company perceived this as being important to consumers: “A citizen of Georgia may go 
to any other state, order a Coca-Cola [and] exclaim, ‘Here’s an old friend!’” Another 
bulletin crowed that, “[m]ore than 600 trade-marked drinks have appeared on the market 
during the life of Coca-Cola only to disappear [...] because ‘it repeats’” (italics added). 
The two longest-serving Company presidents during 1886–1959 were convinced of 
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the Secret Formula’s importance to consumers. In 1899, amidst charges of cocaine 
content, about 20 salesmen, home office personnel, and branch managers met with Asa 
Candler (president, 1888–1916). Someone suggested: “Couldn’t we just take out the 
cocaine?” Candler’s response: “So you want me to change the formula of the country’s 
favorite beverage[?] Never! There is nothing wrong with Coca-Cola. If there was 
anything the matter with it, do you think we would have such a problem keeping 
everyone supplied with it?” (Candler, 1950). Robert Woodruff (president, 1923–1939) 
later expressed his reluctance to change the Formula “except as a matter of life and 
death” (italics added). 
Turning to input costs, the Company knew that they were volatile. However, did the 
Company believe that consumers wanted insurance against cost fluctuations? We again 
draw insight from the Reviewing a “Proud History” bulletins: “We are one of the few 
manufacturers in the [US] who adheres strictly and at all times to a one price policy. [...] 
This is a policy of fair dealing – it begets good will if you sell it to the trade so that it is 
understood.” Also, consider a Company insert in a 1916 Drug Trade Journal: “Some 
said: ‘Raise the price to the retailer.’ [...] That is the summary of advice we have received 
during the past year from people who knew how greatly our cost of making Coca-Cola 
has been advanced [. ...] [W]e would be mighty poor specimens if we tried to make the 
druggist carry the load of our increased costs by cutting down your profits[. ...] The 
burden is ours—we have gladly assumed it.” 31 The Company’s unwillingness to pass 
cost fluctuations to retailers can be interpreted as an indicator of the Company’s efforts to 
prevent the cost fluctuations from, in turn, being passed onto consumers. 
Documenting whether or not the Company perceived Coca-Cola to be addictive is 
                                                 
31
 Reproduced in Coca-Cola Company’s Advertising Copy Collection, 1916–1919, Vol. 5, 00502 ARS. 
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more challenging.32 The Company would never put that in writing.33 However, the 
Company's efforts during WWII to provide soldiers with Coca-Cola—and the responses 
from the soldiers—are telling. American GIs wrote home from European battlefields with 
near-worshipful descriptions of the drink: e.g., “You probably will think that your son has 
had his head exposed to the sun too long [but] three of us guys walked ten miles to buy a 
case of Coca-Cola, then carried it back. You will never know how good it tasted” 
(Pendergrast, 1993, pp. 210–211).34 Woodruff made a pledge: Coke would be made 
available to every member of the armed forces at a nickel (Kahn, 1969, p. 84). Company 
agents even sold nickels (at cost) so that soldiers could buy Coca-Cola in their 
accustomed manner (Coca-Cola Bottler, 1944, p. 35). This could not have been profitable 
in the short run. It is consistent with the Company perceiving its product as habit-forming 
and insuring its consumers against supply fluctuations.  
 
3.4 Observable Implications of Implicit Contracts 
If Coca-Cola is a good candidate product for an implicit contract, and the Coca-Cola 
Company recognized this, then the observable implications would include: 
 evidence of the Company having communicated a pledge to consumers; 
 since it could not set the retail price directly, evidence that the Company 
communicated the pledge and its profitability to retailers; 
 evidence that the Company perceived itself as vulnerable to costly (in terms of 
                                                 
32
 According to Allen (1994, p. 53), Asa Candler used to encourage subtly spreading the idea that Coca-
Cola contained cocaine. 
33
 For example, it is not implausible that Candler’s resistance to removing cocaine from the drink was in 
part indicative of his belief that doing so would no longer allow Coca-Cola to “hook” its customers. 
Furthermore, after winning an extended legal battle (1898–1902) to have Coca-Cola not taxed as a 
proprietary medicine, Company executives would be especially hesitant to establish what could amount to 
providing evidence of Coca-Cola attributes associated with medicines.  
34
 Another soldier wrote: “[O]ne real bottle of Coca-Cola, the first one I have seen here. It was pulled out 
from under the shirt of a pilot. [...] He caressed it, his eyes rolled over it, he smacked his lips at the prospect 
of tasting it. I offered him one dollar for half of it, then two, then three, and five dollars.”  
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goodwill) backlash by reneging on the pledge; 
 evidence of “renegotiations”—the Company’s efforts to mitigate the goodwill 
costs by explaining the necessity of breaking the contract. 
 
4. Evidence of an Implicit Contract in the Case of Coca-Cola 
Next, we present evidence that Coca-Cola's fixed nominal price and quality were part of 
an implicit contract between the Coca-Cola Company and its consumers. This evidence 
consists of advertisements, trade journal inserts, and the Company’s internal documents.  
 
4.1 Extending the Invisible Handshake to Consumers: Communicating the Pledge 
A remarkable feature of this implicit contract is that the Company made it explicit in the 
written guarantees and assurances of millions of print ads, displays, promotional 
giveaway items, etc. Moreover, assurances of quality and price were often included 
together. The guarantee of a constant price appears to have been a "clause" of the implicit 
contract from early on; that of constant quality seems to have evolved later on.  
 
<<COMP: Place Table 2 about here>> 
  
An alternative interpretation of such advertising materials is that they simply included 
the price, which happened to be 5¢. However, many of these advertising materials were 
durable items (e.g., metal signs, metal serving trays, etc.).Table 2 lists the advertising 
material distributed just in 1913. Such materials were offered to retailers to entice more 
purchases. Additionally, the Company would offer to paint retailers’ buildings with large 
Coca-Cola murals providing 700 such paintings in 1925, 820 in 1926, and 835 in 1927.35 
Given the prominence of “5¢” on many of these materials, their value as advertising for 
                                                 
35
 Source: “The Coca-Cola Company: Advertising Expenditures,” Coca-Cola Company archives. 
18 
 
 
 
the Company would likely depreciate (or even turn negative) in the event of the nickel 
price’s disappearance. 
Moving to some examples that span the period 1886–1959, first consider a 1898 ad 
(Atlanta Police Department Bulletin, 1898), when Coca-Cola was sold only in Atlanta. At 
any Atlanta fountain, the ad promised Coca-Cola at "5 cents per Glass." Also, besides 
claiming that it "Relieves Headache Immediately," the ad guaranteed the drink to be 
"Delicious! [and] Refreshing!" This was certainly not a constant quality guarantee, but it 
began a theme that would later evolve into such a guarantee. In a 1903 ad (Atlanta 
Journal, 1903), the Company touted that it was now both "At Soda Fountains and 
Carbonated in Bottles." In either case, it was still "5 CENTS." Ads with similar promises 
appeared in a 1909 Atlanta Constitution. For over a decade, Atlanta consumers were 
promised Coca-Cola for 5¢ in the bottle or at the fountain. 
Coca-Cola did not remain local to Atlanta for long. A 1906 full-page Cosmopolitan 
ad promised it to the entire nation, for "5¢" and "AT ALL FOUNTS AND IN 
BOTTLES." Similar 1906 ads ran in American Theater and Country Life in America. 
Ironically, given the court battles that followed, the Company also ran ads in 1906 stating 
that it was "GUARANTEED UNDER THE PURE FOOD AND DRUG ACT."36 Despite 
later problems with the USDA, the theme of “guaranteeing purity” became recurrent. 
In the early 1900s Coca-Cola faced competition from a myriad of imitators who tried 
hard to be perceived as close substitutes by consumers. By 1908 the Company was 
encouraging consumers to "GET THE GENUINE" Coca-Cola.37  Also, 1912 Coca-Cola 
ads warned "BEWARE!!! of Imitations" and encouraged consumers to "Demand the 
Genuine – Refuse Substitutes."38 Competition with imitators and the purity guarantee 
                                                 
36
 Source: The Coca-Cola Company, "Guaranteed." 
37
 July 16th, 1908 issue of Life; the ad also guaranteed that Coca-Cola was "5¢. Everywhere."   
38
 Source: Advertising Copy Collection, 00349 ARS. 
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complemented each other in an evolving theme of constant quality in the Company's 
advertising.  
During the 1920s Coca-Cola continued to stress the "5¢" price, as in a full-page 1922 
ad in The Ladies Home Journal. Then the 1930s witnessed the introduction of the famous 
"pause that refreshes" slogan.39 The "pause" had by then been part of consumers' lives for 
over 50 years; it was "the best friend thirst ever had." The Company stressed a familiarity 
that would also feed into the evolving theme of constant quality. 
In 1941 issues of National Geographic, Boys' Life, Collier's, Life, Time, and the 
Saturday Evening Post, the "pause that refreshes" was still promised at "5¢," but now 
there was an additional claim: "You trust its quality."40 And in a 1942 Saturday Evening 
Post the "5¢" and "Delicious and Refreshing" Coca-Cola stated that "Quality carries on." 
The guarantee of quality was prominent and the "carries on" implied a commitment to 
continuity over time. By 1945, during WWII sugar shortages and the resulting sugar 
rationing, the Coca-Cola Company evoked this guarantee to explain Coca-Cola shortages 
to civilian consumers. "Where's all the Coke gone, anyway?" asked one ad: 
[T]he answer is: there's a world-wide sugar shortage, caused by world-
wide disorder and confusion that goes along with war. Sugar shortage 
means Coke shortage because Coca-Cola never compromises on quality. 
Today, yesterday, tomorrow—Coca-Cola means Coca-Cola, the same 
quality as always [our emphasis].41 
Such ads still stated "5¢," but now the guarantee of constant quality became explicit.42 
                                                 
39
 See, for example, Nation's Business (1938). 
40
 Source: Advertising Copy Collection, 01625 ARS. 
41
 Source: Advertisement No. S-3. Another ad featured a neighborhood store clerk telling consumers, 
"Sorry, but we're short on Coke today." Consumers are encouraged not to blame the clerk because, again, 
the sugar is being rationed and "there's one thing you can always be sure of—the Coke you get is the real 
thing [and] the same quality you have always known [our emphasis]." Source: Advertisement No. S-2. 
42
 Note that the Coca-Cola Company substituted a small amount of saccharine for sugar and also 
temporarily reduced the caffeine content at this time. However, president Woodruff was very reluctant to 
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These examples come from print ads because they are the most readily available as 
facsimiles at the Coca-Cola archives. However, the Company was issuing similar pledges 
on its durable promotional items (Table 2). Already in 1887 the Company was 
distributing 45 tin signs and oil cloth hangers (Allen, 1994, p. 30).  By the early 1920s 
these materials included 50,000 metal serving trays and 100,000 streetcar signs (Allen, 
1994, pp. 167–168). In 1924 the Company “maintained more than 20,000 painted walls 
and bulletins throughout the United States” and by the 1930s it also maintained 160,000 
billboards across the US (Allen, 1994, p. 206).43 These materials continued to remind 
customers that Coca-Cola still sold for a nickel, while its “quality carries on.” 
 
4.2 Informing and Convincing Retailers 
The Coca-Cola Company also made efforts to inform retailers that it had made an 
implicit contract with consumers and that it was in their common interest not to break it. 
In a 1916 Drug Trade Journal insert during WWI, the Coca-Cola Company told retailers 
that “Price, quality and advertising will remain the same” and stated: “All we ask of our 
dealers is the natural and human reciprocity of serving only the genuine and serving it 
properly.” Presumably, in asking for retailers to "serve it properly," the Company referred 
to 6.5oz at 5¢, using unadulterated syrup. 
By the 1920s the Company was using trade journal inserts to stress the standard 6.5oz 
and 5¢ price as something expected by consumers and profitable to retailers. "This Glass 
increases sales," stated a 1923 insert referring to 6.5oz glasses that could be "bought in 
                                                                                                                                                 
make these changes: “I am very leary[;] and much prefer not to do anything of the kind, except as a matter 
of life and death” (Source: Robert W. Woodruff in a letter to Arthur Acklin, October 2, 1942, Robert W. 
Woodruff Papers, Special Collections Section, Emory University Library). Since we find no evidence that 
customers perceived a change in flavor, we suspect that the Coca-Cola Company believed that it had 
succeeded in keeping quality as constant as its constraints would allow. In making the guarantee of constant 
quality explicit at this time, the Company also positioned itself so that it was vulnerable to backlash.  
43
 Source: Turner Jones of the Coca-Cola Company quoted in a letter dated March 14, 1940 from Lloyd 
Paul Stryker to John M. Drescher of the D’Arcy Advertising Company. 
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quantity from your jobber." The insert referred to "The Right Price" of "5¢" which "is the 
price people expect to pay for Coca-Cola, because it is established by years of custom" 
[our emphasis]. As well, "it gives you [the retailer] a good profit on every sale, but it 
gives you most profit by giving you more sales [and it's] the price that keeps your cash 
register ringing, and that’s the music that builds business."44 
By the 1940s efforts to convince retailers of the profitability of Coca-Cola at 5¢ price 
became even more pronounced. "LOOK AT IT THIS WAY," requested a 1942 insert 
featuring a magnifying glass focused on a nickel: “Coca-Cola magnifies the nickel to real 
importance in your store.”45 Another 1942 insert states the Company's guarantee to 
retailers: “We make this pledge to YOU[.] In national magazines, in newspapers, on 
posters, and over the radio, we're telling the world that the unmatched quality of Coca-
Cola remains the same even though the quantity is limited by Government order”46 
(italics added). All of these inserts explicitly contained "5¢" and may also be viewed as a 
veiled warning to retailers not to charge more, an effort at retail price maintenance.47   
As late as 1950 an insert in Food World touted the explicit pledge: "Continuous 
Quality" and "Continuous Price."48  
 
4.3 Did the Coca-Cola Company Perceive Itself as Vulnerable to Backlash? 
In 1948, Robert Woodruff received an editorial in the mail written by Duke Merritt of the 
                                                 
44
 Source: Trade Paper Insert, reproduced, Coca-Cola Company Archive. Also, in Reviewing "A Proud 
History" 1886 to 1925. Every page included, in the lower margin, an underlying theme: "Use the Retailer's 
figures to show him the profit on Coca-Cola [and] Show him how to push sales to increase the profit[.]" 
Retailers needed to know that "It is not the 5¢ so much as it is the 2,400,000,000 drinks per year. . . . It is 
this volume which enables us to offer the public, at a nickel, an absolutely pure soft drink" (p. 1900). 
45
 It continues: “When you look at Coca-Cola in terms of what you sell in a year, you see a big profit from a 
5¢ sale. On the sale of a case a day your gross profit is $125.00 a year.  How's that for magnifying the value 
of a nickel?” 
46
 Source: Advertising Copy Collection, "Chain Store Age." 
47
 Concerning quality, yet another 1942 insert declared: “QUALITY . . . the quality of genuine goodness. 
That's what your customers recognize in Coca-Cola. . . .  5¢. You trust its quality.” Source: Advertising 
Copy Collection, 01724 ARS. Many of the promotional items listed in Table 2 also had "5¢" imprinted on 
them. See Munsey (1972) for numerous examples of such promotional items of different types. 
48
 Source: Advertising Copy Collection, 02815 ARS. 
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Cartersville, Georgia Daily Tribune. The editorial was written by Merritt "in appreciation 
of the fact that Coca-Cola is the one unchanged friend of childhood, still the same good 
taste at the same nickel price".49 The editorial stated: 
"[W]ay back yonder, a loaf of bread was a nickel, soap was a nickel . . . 
and coffee and milk were a nickel each [and even] beer, was also five 
cents a glass then. . .  Coca-Cola has changed neither its price nor its 
quality. . .  Look what has happened to other five-cent items in Coca-
Cola's nickel life time. Bread is 15 cents a loaf, in most places, soap is 10 
and 15 cents a cake, coffee and milk each cost a dime . . . and beer is 30 
cents, we hear. But our old friend Coca-Cola still remains the same, 
merely five cents." 
Woodruff personally replied to Merritt: "Your comment regarding our product and our 
Company describes exactly what has been our desire[.]" 
". . . In the recent era of rationing and the subsequent period of high—and 
rising—costs, the maintenance of the 5¢ price has not been devoid of 
difficulty, but the compensations that arise from doing so, as exemplified 
by your friendly remarks, are many and not the least of them is the good 
will embodied in such expressions as these in your editorial" [our 
emphasis].50 
                                                 
49
 Source: Robert W. Woodruff Papers, Coll. 10, Box 124. 
50
 The Company preserved copies of numerous editorials and articles expressing similar sentiments. For 
example, in the December 28, 1947 Sunday Booster (Lincoln-Belmont area of Chicago), Leo Lerner wrote: 
“No doubt you have noticed the new look in the grocery stores? [sic] It's on the price tags. The day my wife 
sent me shopping . . . I asked the proprietor if there was anything else in the store [besides Coca-Cola] that 
had not risen in price. . . [H]e shook his head, melancholy as he could be. ‘Nope,’ said the grocer. ‘Coke is 
the only thing in the whole place that hasn't gone up in price’. . . I stuffed the groceries I bought for $3 into 
my overcoat pocket and went out. On the way I tipped my hat to the Coca-Cola.”  And an editorial from a 
1946 Worthington Globe (Worthington, Minnesota) lashed out at individual retailers that deviated from the 
5¢ standard: “[S]ome local firms have selected for a price upping the very commodity that will discredit all 
these reassuring words and action – the lowly ‘Coke’. . . [Here] come a bunch of local pirates before the 
clods are dry on OPA's grave, who would take Coca-Cola out of the mouths of ordinary common people 
and make a dime drink of it—nectar for blue bloods to drink. And this without a cent increase in the 
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Having communicated the pledge of constant price and quality to consumers and 
retailers, Woodruff seems to have felt that the Company’s goodwill was structured in a 
way that left it vulnerable to a costly backlash in the event of breach of the implicit 
contract.  
This is supported by the Company’s issue of an (undated) set of “Instructions for 
Salesmen in Campaign for Promoting 5¢ Price on Coca-Cola.” In it the writer ponders: 
“how would one-third of your fountain customers feel if they were required to pay 100% 
more [than] they had been accustomed to paying, or that they felt was right for them to 
pay[?]” [our emphasis].51 The document also claims what may be an implicit 
acknowledgement that new consumers were concerned with future price fluctuations: 
holding to the nickel price “attracts youth – your customers today and tomorrow.” 
In 1948, vice president Ralph Hayes wrote to president William Hobbs on the 
importance of maintaining the nickel price: “our bottlers should realize increasingly that 
they are not only in the process of effectuating a monumental merchandising achievement 
but that the press and public hold them in high esteem for the vision and the courage so 
far shown.” Fellow executive and future president H. Burke Nicholson then circulated 
that letter widely throughout the company stating that nickel price maintenance was “a 
basic problem of vital interest to our entire organization.” 
Documents from 1950, when inflation made the nickel Coke increasingly untenable, 
offer the clearest evidence that the Coca-Cola Company perceived itself as vulnerable to 
loss of goodwill. A representative of the Coca-Cola Bottling Company wrote to Eugene 
                                                                                                                                                 
wholesale price. Fie on them! May their cash registers tarnish in a pause that will refresh their memories of 
a mutual pledge taken to 'hold the line' and combat inflation!” 
51
 The writer makes an interesting exception for “outlets such as night-clubs [and] cocktail lounges” where 
enforcing the 5¢ price was not thought to be as important “since the customer expects to pay a premium.” 
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Kelly, head of international operations, concerning the “price situation:”52 
"[A]ll of the facts and figures that we have [...] tend to point out the 
pitfalls and the possibility of difficulty on the long term basis, particularly 
have we pointed out the possible public reaction such as that which you 
know about in connection with Standard Stations, who changed over some 
600 of their machines to 10¢ slots and because of public reaction reduced 
the price to 5¢ recently." 
The Company, fearful of the backlash as retailers abandoned the nickel, hired a 
consulting firm to conduct a survey of retail prices and consumer reaction to price 
increases in 27 towns.53  
Almost all of the Company documents we located focus on the costs of changing the 
nickel price. What is not found in the internal documents is also notable: any reference at 
all to altering the Secret Formula or serving size. Recall that both dominant personalities 
in Coca-Cola’s early history—Asa Candler and Robert Woodruff—established that 
changing the Secret Formula was not on the table.54 It would have made little sense to 
elaborate upon the costs of doing something that was essentially taboo.  
 
4.4 Renegotiations 
The Coca-Cola Company eventually recognized that the nominal nickel price was 
inconsistent with the realities of the post-WWII inflationary economy. We find some 
                                                 
52
 Despite his primary role in international operations, the letter refers entirely to US operations and was 
copied to President H. Burke Nicholson. 
53
 Source: Memorandum dated November 7, 1950 from John Toigo, D’Arcy Advertising Company, to H. 
Burke Nicholson. We located the summary results of one such survey (for Alexandria, LA) in the Coca-
Cola Archives that described “swift public reaction:”  “At first, the public bought up all available Coca-
Cola at the old price. As soon as the supply was depleted, [a] boycott was imposed.” The summary reported 
several “typical consumer comments” including: “Buy a Coke? Not me. Haven’t had one since the price 
went up. I’ll wait until it comes down.” “They will be sorry. I haven’t had a Coke all week and I won’t until 
it sells for a nickel.” “The bastards! No one buys Coke now.” “Coke will be back to a nickel soon. Just wait 
and see.” 
54
 Kahn (1969, p. 74) notes that Woodruff, upon becoming president of Coca-Cola, “established several 
guidelines [among which was that] he would never tamper with the quality of the product.” 
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evidence that around 1950 the Company contemplated a “renegotiation” of the implicit 
contract with consumers.55 For example, a 1950 letter from John Toigo of the Company’s 
primary advertising firm, D’Arcy, to vice president H. B. Nicholson, suggests: “[W]hen a 
bottler raises a price complete merchandising and advertising programs might be 
furnished to him so that a proper price level at which the product should sell at retail 
could be quickly established, just as against 80¢ we established the nickel price.”56 
Less than one month later a “Coca-Cola Price Study” based on 38 towns nationwide 
was circulated inside the Company.57 One of the suggestions based on the findings: if a 
bottler raised its price then the “bottler should be prepared to fully advertise and 
merchandise suggested new [retail] price levels[,] as assiduously as we have the 5¢ and 
25¢ [six packs] prices under the old price structure.” 
These proposals can be interpreted as plans to renegotiate standard prices for Coca-
Cola. We find no evidence that such plans were pursued, but the fact that they were 
seriously contemplated is itself evidence in favor of an implicit contract’s existence. 
 
5. Relationship between the Implicit and Explicit Contracts 
In 1899 the Coca-Cola Company signed over bottling rights for most of the US to 
Tennessee lawyers, Benjamin Thomas and Joseph Whitehead.58 They could purchase 
syrup from the Company at 92¢/gallon in perpetuity. In Levy and Young (2004, pp. 778–
782) we argue that a constant retail price could be optimal if Coca-Cola acted like a 
monopoly in a particular stage of processing where the price of its own output (syrup) 
                                                 
55
 In a previous version of this paper, we also argued that the backlash associated with the introduction of 
“New Coke” in 1985 was evidence of the quality clause and its importance to consumers. The Bottler's 
incurred a direct loss of $30 million in the form of unsold New Coke inventories according to the Atlanta 
Journal and Constitution (1995) and Collins (1995). In that case, the hasty (re)introduction of “Coca-Cola 
Classic” represented attempts of renegotiations. 
56
 Source: Letter from John Toigo, D’Arcy Advertising Company, to H. B. Nicholson, November 6, 1950. 
57
 Source: “Coca-Cola Price Study,” an internal Coca-Cola Company document, dated December 4, 1950. 
58
 Mississippi and New England had previously been contracted for by two separate individuals. 
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was fixed. Here we are suggesting an alternative source of price rigidity. However, we 
believe that the two explanations are related:  the contract with bottlers created incentives 
for the Company to develop and strengthen an implicit contract with its consumers. 
In 1900 the original bottling company split into two regional “parent bottlers” (north 
and south US) that licensed bottling rights to smaller bottlers. Soon the Company was 
shipping syrup directly to the smaller bottlers. According to Allen (1994, p. 109), the 
parent bottlers “took a royalty on every gallon, even though they never handled a drop.”   
The contract was amended in 1901. The Company agreed to sell syrup to the parent 
bottlers at $0.90/gallon plus a $0.10/gallon rebate for advertising materials.59 In that 
form, the contract lasted until 1921.60  We know that Coca-Cola was the largest soft drink 
producer; it had market power based on its brand. Yet it acted as a price-taker for a 20-
year period. As long as its profit margin was positive, the Company’s profits could 
increase only by increasing the quantity of syrup sold. The retailers and bottlers, 
however, were in principle able to exploit the Coca-Cola brand and raise the price on the 
differentiated product. It would then understandably be in the Company’s interest to strip 
them of their price-setting ability. Forging an implicit contract with consumers—one that 
included the 5¢ price—may have helped to accomplish this.   
Of course, explicit evidence that Coca-Cola tried to deprive retailers and bottlers of 
price setting ability is hard to come by. As Fortune reported in 1951, “Coke has been 
charged with coercing its bottlers to stay at the 80-cent case price, but the charge has 
never been even nearly substantiated.” The Company seems to have understood the 
                                                 
59
 Source: Thomas Ben, letter to W.D. Boyce, November 15, 1901, “Benwood.” 
60
 In 1921 a new agreement was signed where the Company sold syrup to the parent bottlers at $1.17/gallon 
plus, for every cent that a pound of sugar rose in excess of 7¢, a 6¢ premium (Pendergrast, 1993, p. 144). 
This contract remained unchanged through the demise of the nickel Coke (Johnson, 1987, p. 13). 
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precarious position that such “coercion” could create a legal complication.61  
 
6. Alternative Explanations for the Episode 
In Levy and Young (2004, pp. 789–794) we carefully considered but ultimately ruled out 
several alternative explanations for the price rigidity of Coca-Cola. These included price 
points (Kashyap, 1995) and productivity growth that could offset unfavorable changes in 
market conditions. However, while our previous paper focuses on an explicit contract 
with bottlers and two “technological” factors, the present discussion of an implicit 
contract makes it worthwhile to consider two other alternative explanations.  
 
6.1 Investing in Brand (Stressing Quality) to Charge Premium Price 
A firm may use advertising as a means of product differentiation. Competitors tried to 
imitate Coca-Cola, believing that they could pass themselves off with similar names. In 
such settings, firms may use persuasive (rather than informative) advertising to shift 
consumer preferences and establish or strengthen brand loyalty (Carlton and Perloff, 
2005; Bagwell 2007) to increase market power (Telser, 1964). Product differentiation 
leads to higher profits via higher demand and lower price elasticity, allowing for a 
premium price to be charged (Waldman and Jensen, 2001, p. 357). Persuasive advertising 
can also deter new entry by increasing the costs of inducing consumers to switch from 
established goods (Bagwell, 2007, p. 1715). 
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 For example, a 1947 legal department memo noted: “in Federal Trade Commission vs. Eastman Kodak 
[...] the Commission held that since Kodachrome film had only one source, price maintenance could not be 
protected.” This memo was included with correspondence from Company vice-president Ralph Hayes 
concerning retail deviations from 5¢. Source Ralph Hayes, letter to W. J. Hobbs, December 9, 1946; 
attached, legal department memo dated January 9, 1947, “5¢ Price for Coca-Cola.” However, in the 1950 
“Coca-Cola Price Study” a recommendation to bottlers was: “Coca-Cola should be sold as cheaply as 
possible consistent with profit,” which might mean that as long as there’s a positive profit margin for 
bottlers and retailers, keep the price at 5¢; the Company will profit via volume. Also, in a somewhat 
comical letter drafted to bottlers (attached to an August 23, 1950 letter from vice president H. B. Nicholson 
to Pope Brock) after seven full pages presenting arguments why the bottler should hold the 80 cent per case 
wholesale price, on the eighth and final page it states: “In spite of the fact that our business and yours was 
built on the 80¢ price, we have no sentimental attachment to it, and let me repeat, we have no desire to 
influence you to maintain it.” It is unclear whether or not this letter was ever actually sent to bottlers. 
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This explanation, however, is inconsistent with the Coca-Cola making the 5¢ price a 
focal point of advertising. There is ample evidence that advertising containing price 
information increases the price elasticity of demand.62 It is also inconsistent with the 
Company’s persistent resistance to retail price increases.  
By promoting and pushing the 5¢ price of Coke, the Company conditioned the public 
to perceive any price hike as unjustifiable. It created a point of extreme price elasticity, 
effectively limiting its own market power. Thus, the strategy of heavily promoting and 
committing to the nickel price would be inconsistent with a goal of increasing profits via 
product differentiation and a lower price elasticity of demand.  
 
6.2 Market Penetration through Lower Price 
Coca-Cola may have used an “introductory” low price in order to gain a foothold and 
capture market share by drawing customers from existing firms. In the marketing 
literature, it is well-known that a low introductory price often employed by entrant firms, 
creates product awareness and induces consumer trials (Urban and Houser, 1993). 
However, a nickel price policy lasting over 7 decades is inconsistent with this 
explanation, although the Company undoubtedly pursued some forms of market 
penetration strategies early on. During 1889–1893, for example, it distributed “tickets” 
throughout the Atlanta area that, when presented at a fountain, entitled the holder to a 
complimentary Coca-Cola. This strategy was perceived as effective and subsequently 
expanded. From 1894 to 1913, about 8.5 million coupons were redeemed by the 
Company.63 
The nickel price, however, was not lower than the prices of similar products at that 
                                                 
62
 See, for example, a meta-study conducted by Kaul and Wittink (1995) who considered 18 studies 
covering a 20-year period. 
63
 As reflected on in Reviewing a Proud History: “We gave it to hundreds. They learned by doing. Now 
billions pay for it! 2,400,000,000 drinks a year!” Source: www.thecoca-
colacompany.com/heritage/pdf/cokelore/Heritage_CokeLore_cocacolasampling.pdf. 
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time. For example, many soft drinks during the late 1800s, which at the time were often 
marketed as patent medicine, were selling for 5¢. Other drinks, including beer, coffee, 
milk, etc., were also selling for a nickel. Indeed, Joseph Biedenharn, the first entrepreneur 
to successfully bottle Coca-Cola (in Mississippi in 1894), recollected in a 1959 issue of 
the Coca-Cola Bottler that “soda water bottlers didn’t want to bother with it; besides, 
they, said, the price of Coca-Cola was too high” (Tedlow, 1990, p. 41). So, the initial 
pricing of the product does not appear to have been designed to undercut competitors. 
More importantly, however, the Company’s decision to stick to the nickel price even 
after becoming the dominant player in the market is inconsistent with this explanation. 
Recall that in 1945 the Coca-Cola Company had a 50 percent market share of the $579 
million bottled non-alcoholic carbonated beverage industry. Having achieved such 
dominance, one would expect that the Company would move away from the nickel price 
and raise it if it followed a market penetration strategy through an introductory low price. 
The company, however, maintained the nickel price for another 15 years. 
 
7. Conclusion: What Do We Learn from the Coca-Cola Case? 
We have documented a period of more than 70 years of price and quality rigidity for 
arguably the world’s most widely recognized consumer good. Yet Coca-Cola is still only 
a single good. Does this case study have broader relevance? We believe it does.  
First, it points towards a widespread phenomenon of “customary prices” in the late 
19th and early-to-middle 20th century US. For example, many food items (e.g., a mug of 
beer, a cup of coffee, a loaf of bread, a pack of Wrigley’s gum, a bar of Hershey’s 
chocolate, etc.) also sold for a nickel for many years. As discussed in Levy and Young 
(2004), many US chain stores operating in that period (e.g., Woolworth, Kresge’s 
(Kmart), etc.) were "Nickel" or “Five-and-Dime” stores, selling goods only for 5¢ or 10¢. 
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Customary prices may be important for explaining why US nominal retail prices were 
more rigid historically during that period (e.g., Kackmeister, 2007) and implicit contracts 
may have played a role in their establishment.64  
The Coca-Cola implicit contract episode highlights an extraordinarily successful firm 
that effectively chose to almost entirely forgo nominal price and quality adjustment. 
While the implications of costly price adjustment have been widely studied, analyses 
considering adjustment along other margins are rare. Danziger (2001) and Anderson and 
Toulemonde (2004) are examples; they consider firm behavior in the presence of both 
price and quantity adjustment costs.65 To our knowledge there are no analogous studies 
that also incorporate quality changes. The Coca-Cola case study highlights the need for 
empirical studies of costs of adjustment along these margins (e.g., Müller et al., 2007). 
Finally, to our knowledge, this is the first study to offer direct evidence of an implicit 
contract in a consumer goods market. How prevalent are implicit contracts in such 
markets? This paper may serve as a guide to developing relevant testable hypotheses to 
identify such goods. It may also help to design surveys that identify implicit contracts, as 
in Blinder et al. (1988). Of course, this paper may also provide impetus to further 
narrative case studies.  
  
                                                 
64
 Young and Blue (2005) find that from 1938 to 1951 Bayer Aspirin, Gillette Blue Blades, and Tums 
Tablets had constant prices in Sears, Roebuck catalogs. KC Baking Powder sold at 25¢ for over 50 years. 
Source: Grocer's Want Book, a pamphlet distributed by the Jaques Mfg. Co., Chicago, IL, the maker of the 
K.C. Baking Powder, to the retail grocers for managing and keeping track of their inventories (undated). 
65
 Ginsburgh, et al. (1991) is an early example of a model of quantity adjustment costs that generates sticky 
prices similar to a menu cost model. In Levy and Snir (2013), firms decide whether to adjust prices or 
quantities based on the attention time-constrained shoppers pay to prices and quantities when they shop. 
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Table 1. Cost of Raw Materials as Percent of Soft-Drink Industry Production 
and Coca-Cola Advertising as Percent of Sales, Select Years, 1879–1955 
Year 
 
Raw Materials’ Cost Share in  
Soft Drink Industry 
Coca-Cola 
Advertising Share  
1879 0.441 - 
1889 0.318 - 
1899 0.368 0.123 
1909 0.379 0.167 
1919 0.507 0.081 
1930 0.478 0.112 
1940 0.420 0.089 
1950 0.385  
1955 0.430  
Sources: Raw materials share is from Riley (1958). Percentages are computed using data on 
value of production, number of plants, and average raw materials used per plant. Advertising 
expenditures are from “The Coca-Cola Company Advertising Expenditures,” a Coca-Cola 
Archives document. Sales are from “Sales of Coca-Cola,” a Coca-Cola Archives document.  
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Table 2. Advertising Material Distributed by the Coca-Cola Company in 1913 
       Amount Item 
 
200,000 4-head cutouts for window display 
5,000,000 Lithograph metal signs from 6” X 10” to 5’ X 8’ 
10,000 Enamel metal signs 12” X 36”, 18” X 45” 
60,000 Fountain festoons 
250,000 Special signs for bottlers 12” X 36” 
50,000 Cardboard cutouts for window display 
60,000 4-head festoons for soda fountains 
10,000 Lithograph metal display signs 
20,000 Lithograph metal display containing reproduction of bottles 
50,000 Metal signs for tacking under windows 
200,000 Fiber signs for tacking on walls of refreshment stands 
2,000,000 Trays for soda fountains 
50,000 Window trims 
250,000 5-head window displays and mirror decorations 
1,000,000 Japanese fans 
50,000 Christmas wreaths and bell decorations for fountains 
50,000 The Coca-Cola Company song 
1,000,000 Calendars 
50,000 Thermometers 
10,000,000 Match books 
50,000,000 Doilies (paper) 
10,000 Large calendars for business offices 
144,000 Pencils 
20,000 Blotters 
10,000 Framed metal signs for well displays 
5,000 Transparent globes, mosaic art glasswork 
25,000 Baseball score cards 
$300,000 Newspaper advertising 
  
Source: Tedlow (1990, Exhibit 2-1, p. 53) 
 
